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J. D. Y. Peel
Culture does not, on the whole, seem to occupy
a strategic, or even a minor but assured, place in
most serious thinking about the sources and con-
ditions of development. Economists tend to rele-
gate it to the limbo of 'non-economic' factors.
Marxists and radically inclined thinkers regard
it as smoke-screen and rationalization or as a
mere effect of the real phenomena, the structures
of exploitation. It tends to get left to the moral
exhortations which accompany the presentation
of budgets and five-year plans, or else the private
refiexions of planners. Yet it finds expression in
a widespread feeling among laymen that a
people's religious traditions, 'national character'
and 'way of life' must have some effect, though
an indeterminate one, on their material develop-
ment.
It is easy enough to find reasons for the neglect
of culture for 'harder' factors like the terms of
world trade, the structure of control over key re-
sources, etc.1 The typical 'cultural' explanation
has been a variant of either Weber's argument
about the partial responsibility of Calvinism for
capitalism or a psychologistic thesis which relates
economic backwardness to the prevalence of an
anti-modernizing personality.2 There are two
well-founded lines of objection to most theories
of this kind. Firstly, they tend to be logically
circular or ill-demonstrated. Behaviour alleged to
be anti-developmental is explained with reference
to a personality type governed by certain values
and those values in turn are merely inferred from
the anti-developmental behaviour. Alleged reli-
gious values, such as Islam's fatalism or Hindu-
ism's other-worldliness, are usually not adequately
connected at the empirical level to the behaviour
they are held to explain, and it is rarely
established how much of an independent variable
the culture is. Secondly, such theories are largely
ideological. Their function is to assign the blame
for under-development to the peoples of the Third
World themselves: the fault lies within their
souls, as it were, and only conversion to the ideals
of one of Samuel Smiles' (or Everett Rogers')
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1 See J. D. Y. Peel, "Cultural Factors in the Contemporary
Theory of Development", Archives Européennes de Sociologie
XIV, 1973, for a survey and critique of much of the
literature.
2 5. N. Eisenstadt's collection of readings The Protestant Ethic
and Modernisation, 1968 presents a fair sample cf typical
arguments. Ois the psychological side, see the well-known
works of E. E. Hagen, D. C. McClelland and R. A. Levine.
heroes will enable them to overcome their back-
wardness. This diagnosis remains unrelated to an
examination of the context of underdevelopment
as a social system which is historically en-
gendered. More serious still is the implication that
the true path to development lies through the
spread of the entrepreneurial attitudes and man-
agerial skills typical of the capitalist Westthough
this is very likely an option on which history has
foreclosed.
But the weakness of these arguments does not
oblige us to dismiss culture as a feature of no
consequence for the process of development. Cul-
ture does not just mean 'values' or personality,
but rather the great corpus of techniques, know-
ledge, models of social organization, ideals and
aspirations, specific to a society, which is handed
down and learned in each generation and enables
a particular form of social life to take place.
Culture is a 'way of life', rather than the actual
observable pattern of living at any one time. It
consists of ideal elements: people's notions about
what exists and about the conditions of their
existence, about what they would like to see for
themselves and their society and about how they
might achieve them.3 If we begin the explanation
of social change by delineating the context in
which it occurs, we can only complete it by re-
lating it to the ideas of the people who confront
that context as a given.
Cultural ends and cultural means
Developmentand here I mean what Institutes
of Development Studies think they are contribut-
ing to, rather than what an evolutionary cultural
anthropologist may conceive to be the pattern of
centuries of historymust be seen as a culturally
shaped process in a more precise and strong
sense. Such direction as there has been in the
history of human societysecular increases in
productivity, population density, scale and com-
plexity of political organizationhas been tele-
onomic rather than teleological. Individuals,
groups and societies have acted purposively with
respect to particular problems, and some out-
comes have thus been the results of their purposes.
But any directionality of the whole has been the
sum of the unintended consequences of this. But
since the Enlightenment articulated the goal of
mankind's perfectability, the hope has been that
3 For a sophisticated series of statement, about culture,
especially in relation to developing countries, see C. Geertz,
The Interpretation of Cultures, 1973.
change for the better might be engineered beyond
the horizon of the immediate problems. Develop-
ment rests on the conviction that humanity can
really turn history into a process of universal,
self-sustaining improvement of its condition: a
genuine teleology. This may be the sheerest self-
deluding hubrisnot least because such a con-
ception requires a collective subject when, in
fact, the national collective actors appear to have
radically opposed interestsbut it does seem to
me that this is what our concept of development
presupposes. Development is about the relation
of means (which are actions) to ends (which are
cultural ideals), and development studies are
essentially concerned with formulating criteria
(themselves cultural elements par excellence) for
the evaluation of actions directed towards attain-
ing those ends.
* * *
So expressed, in merely general terms, this seems
unexceptionable, with no obvious implications for
a different practice. Culture may seem not to
matter either because ends vary randomly (and
so cancel one another out) or because there is
such unanimity about them. Men, it is argued,
are motivated by the same sorts of things and
respond to stimuli in the same sort of way, so
that there is a great measure of agreement about
what the end of development is: basically, higher
living standards for individuals (evenly higher, if
possible), and greater power and effectiveness at
the national level. Development studieswhatever
their ideological leaningtend systematically to
deny that the ends of development are other than
universalist or that these universalist elements are
significantly adulterated by any accompanying
particularismsay of a religion like Islam or a
national tradition like the Japanese. Above all it
is this attitude which sociology and anthropology,
in stressing the significance of culture, set out to
challenge in development studies. For even
universally-desired goals of development are al-
ways desired in a context of other kinds of end.4
For it must be wealth and power for a particular
kind of society that is desired; and action to
obtain these ends is further qualified by the role
of culture in selecting the means to attain them.
It is often assumed that the universalism of
development entails the sacrifice of cultural parti-
cularity. It seems to be so in part, but people do
not initially accept it and abandon their parti-
cularities reluctantly; for they want the universals
of wealth and power to preserve their parti-
cularities. They want it both ways, and we can-
4 This is explored with some sensitivity in P. L. Berger,
Pyramids of Sacrifice, 1974, esp. Chap. 6.
not say they won't have a measure of success in
achieving it.
This comes out very clearly if we look at the
development attempts of a particular civilization,
such as Islam, over a good historical sweep. Be-
ginning with the Ottoman realization, in the
sixteenth century, of Western Europe's technical
and economic superiority,5 these entered a new
phase with Mohammed Ah in the early nine-
teenth, and are clearly of major international
significance today. The actions of a Colonel
Ghaddafi or a King Hassan are significantly
shaped both by Islamic ends and by the institu-
tional means provided by their societies, and must
remain inexplicable except in terms of this
history and culture. The great world religions
have been very potent sources of cultural deter-
mination, but not primarily as the source of a
distinct 'social psychology' which would operate
on adherents to make them more or less prone
to social action of a particular kind. There is
that in Max Weber, which has led to the feeble
psycho-social theories of development I have
criticized. More significant are the institutional
frameworks which the world religions, once
socially embodied, have built up. These are not
the once-given reproduction of theological 'genes'
(as Parsons' unfortunate simile has it)6 but the
precipitate of a whole history, not absolutely
fixed but still influential as the source of what
people collectively aim at and of how they set
about trying to get it.
The 'culture' in structure
Thus, few 'hard' factors have been accorded such
significance for the course of development as the
patterns of land ownership. To the extent that
state ownership of land was a feature of North
Indian society (let us leave the 'Asiatic Mode of
Production') it seems to have been a consequence,
as Marx was partially aware, of Islamic doctrines
of land tenure, introduced by the Moghuls in
the course of establishing a Muslim state struc-
ture.7 That doctrine itself was a heritage from
the Bedouin early bearers of Islam (reinforced by
later ruling groups of Turkic nomad origin),
applied by them to the peasant populations they
conquered. Built into a syndrome of social in-
stitutions characteristic of Islam, it becomes part
5 Cf. Fernand Braud2l, The Mediterranean . . . in the Age of
Philip II, Second edn. 1966, Fcntana edn. 1973, Vol. II, pp.
798-801.
6 Societies: Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives, 1966,
p. 6. The analogue of "code", used for both, reduces genes
and symb:lic systems, like language and culture, to the ,am
basis.
7 Angus Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth:
India and Pakistan since the Moghuls, 1971, Chap. 2, and
Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 1974.
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of the social blueprints or organizational reper-
tory most availableand appealingto Muslim
rulers.
An organizational form, distinctive of a particular
culture, may be important less as an end in itself
than as a convenient means for attaining some
more universalist goalbut a means which,
coming to shape a new emergent order, is not just
a means. Thus the Senegalese economy today is
permeated by the operations of the Mouride reli-
gious fraternity, and though this emerged because
it was able to provide quite universalist benefits
(mainly land for a warrior class displaced by the
French conquest in 1886), it could only do so
through using two locally available cultural
models of organization: the Muslim tariqa and
the Wolof co-operative work group.8 The syn-
thesis effected by the Mourides is not just the
superficial dress for quite universalist exploitation,
but an essential component of the total situation
upon which development plans in Senegal must
work. Even where the flexibility of culture to any
new demands put upon it is stressed (as with the
adoption of cocoa-cultivation among the Akan
of Ghana), the comparison with areas with differ-
ent pre-adoption histories and cultures shows how
much the chosen options were governed by parti-
cularist cultural considerations which endure.
Compare the very high levels of productivity of
the Akan with the lower levels among the
Yoruba, the other great cocoa producers of West
Africa.9 Akan men were able to concentrate ex-
clusively on cocoa, subsistence agriculture being
undertaken by women, whereas the Yoruba
farmers, since women play such a small role in
agriculture, need to devote time to subsistence as
well as cash-crop production. We can say little
about the origin of these differing sex-roles in the
economic organization of the two peoples. The
rationality they each have is not a universal one,
but a particularist one,'° and it is as part of cul-
ture that it has continued to shape contemporary
performance.
In emphasising the importance of culture, I am
urging that we need to analyse the historical roots
of the conjuncture in which development is
8 D. B. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, 1971, and
Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of aSenegalese Peasant Soczety, 197f.
9 P. Hill. Migrant Cocoa-farmers of Southern Ghana, 1962.
and S. S. Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change
in Rural Western Nig'ria. 1975.
10 This pace a remark cf P. Hill's (Studies in Rural Capitalism
in West Africa, 1970. o. 12) that "division of labour between
men and women is based on economic good sense, not on
mysterious traditional sex-roles." These are not mutually
exclusive, however, and it is mysterious (in the sense that
no-one has been able to explain) why, say, th Yoruba
division cal labour by te's is distinct from that of their neigh-bours who share tl" sanee ecological and historical para-
meters. Cf. further, E. Bos:rup, Womass's Role in Economic
Development, 1970, Chap. 1,
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sought. Any given element of culturean aspira-
tion, an organizational model, or beliefs about the
external worldthat influence how people
respond to a situation, is a precipitate of their
history, even when they do not consciously see
it as 'part of our traditional culture'. But of some
elements they are conscious, and these are likely
to be especially important. Above all, what people
think about the nature and conditions of progress
in the past is inevitably a powerful source of
what they will undertake in the future.
The contingent meaning of 'development'
It is, therefore, surprising that so little work has
been done on indigenous ideas about development
itself. Indigenous historical ideas have been quite
widely investigated, it is true, but mostly only
from an interest in their role as legitimating
charters (significantly, a viewpoint which reduces
them to being the effect of structural pressures)'1.
Other aspects of culturesocial roles, moral pre-
ferences, cosmological ideas, the local distribution
of power and resources o far as these are cul-
turally shapedhave all been looked at for their
bearing on deve1opment. But if people are to be
regarded as the subjects, rather than the objects,
of development processes, any proposals for their
future must be adequately related to what they
perceive of their past.
Here I shall give a single example drawn from
recent research on the social history of a size-
able Yoruba town.12 Developmentin the sense
of state-endorsed plans for raising the whole level
of social productionwas inaugurated by a local
ruler just at the onset of the colonial epoch, and
can now be said to be a subject on which nearly
everyone, including farmers not literate in
English, has opinions, which it is not hard to
elicit. At one level it is synonymous with the
acquisition of individual and collective consump-
tion goods which are quite universally valued.
Various indigenous terms exist, translatable as
'progress', 'improvement', etc. One of these,
usually rendered 'enlightenment', is of more
interest as it carries with it a theory about the
nature and conditions of development. It makes
it dependent upon contact with the outside world
especially through Western literary education.
This notion has much historical validation:
traditionally state power was derived from con-
trol of external linkages and knowledge, rather
than land, was the key scarce resource. More
recently it is validated through the personal
11 Fer example, A. F. Robertson, "Histories and Political
Ooposition in Ahafo, Ghana", Africa, XIIlI, 1973.
12 Fieldwork for the project, entitled "A Sociological History
of Ilesha: the incorporation of a Yoruba community into
wider social, political and economic units, l895-l97S", was
undertaken in 1973-75, financed by a grant from the SSRC.
advancement of educated individuals and the
community's need of its educated sons to sponsor
its interests at higher levels. Policy at the highest
levelthrough complex processes of interplay
between ordinary people, communal leaders, state
officials and policy makershas been shaped by
these ideas, which underlie the key role accorded
to education in official development plans from
the 1950s until today. Plans for educational in-
vestment were also decked out with internationaBy
current arguments about the need to invest in
manpower but, whatever their validity, it is hard
not to believe that these were convenient justifi-
cation for policies which were rooted in prevalent
local assessments of the causes and conditions of
development.
This seems to be the most fundamental argument
for us to take the culture of the subjects of
development seriouslyespecially for those of us
who are not citizens of the less developed coun-
tries themselves. Academics produce culture. Who
for? Insofar as it is for our own countries and
governments, it is outside my present concern,
though the same general arguments apply. For
the rest, the culture produced is intended to affect
in some way development in the Third World. A
sustained conversation or the mutual translation
of culture is the nature of our activity, rather
than some kind of social engineering.'3 If our
good faith is granted, it is, in the vital instance,
the ideas of the subjects of development with
which we must engage. If our activity is to have
any consequences for ongoing processes of
change, we must synthesize our own ideas with
theirs, or invoke the criteria implicit in them or,
if need be, try to show that they are mistaken in
the assessment of their historical experience. Un-
less they are sensitive to the culture of the sub-
jects of development, theorists of development will
hardly fail to achieve the absurd posture of being,
as it were, authors of plays which nobody is
interested in performing.
13 P. L. nerger et al. treat briefly of this in The Homeless
Mind, 1973, Chap. 7; a much more sophisticated handling
of it is N. Daniel's The Cultural Barrier: Problems in the
Exchange of Ideas, 197S.
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